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At the UN High-Level Meeting on non-communicable diseases (NCD) in September 2011, each member
state was challenged to create a multisectoral national policy and plan for the prevention and control of
non-communicable disease by 2013. Few low-income countries, however, currently have such plans.
Their governments are likely to turn for assistance in drafting and implementation to multilateral agen-
cies and Contract Technical Support Organizations recommended by development partners. Yet because
many NCD seen in the lowest-income countries differ signiﬁcantly from those prevalent elsewhere, exist-
ing providers of external technical support may lack the necessary experience to support strategic plan-
ning for NCD interventions in these settings. This article reviews currently available mechanisms of
technical support for health sector planning. It places them in the broader historical context of post-
World War II international development assistance and the more recent campaigns for horizontal
‘‘South-South’’ cooperation and aid effectiveness. It proposes bilateral technical assistance by low
income-countries themselves as the natural evolution of development assistance in health. Such pro-
grams, it argues, may be able to improve the quality of technical support to low-income countries for
strategic planning in the NCD area while directing resources to the regions where they are most needed.Developing countries face a growing burden of
major chronic diseases and associated risk factors
that already predominate in high-income settings,
such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer,
respiratory illnesses, and mental illness. However,
the risk factors and clinical course of many non-
communicable diseases (NCD) seen in the lowest-
income countries (along with resource-limited re-
gions of middle-income countries) differ signifi-
cantly from those prevalent elsewhere. Among the
‘‘bottom billion’’––populations living on less than a
US dollar a day––risk factors for NCD are often
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can stem from pollution and lack of access to food
or basic health care, including untreated human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), malaria, and other
infectious causes. Endemic NCD present a chal-
lenge for strategic planning and resource mobiliza-
tion that is not yet fully captured by the recent
attention to chronic diseases in the developing
world.
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al national policies and plans for the prevention and
control of non-communicable diseases.’’ The Gen-
eral Assembly mandated specific action to
‘‘strengthen and integrate, as appropriate, non-
communicable disease policies and programmes
into health-planning processes and the national
development agenda of each Member State’’ (Sect.
45) [1]. Yet, only 9 of the 32 low-income countries
recognized by the World Bank currently have
NCD strategic plans; just 3 of them are in sub-
Saharan Africa.
The response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the
first decade of the 21st century offers some cause
for optimism. After resources became available for
comprehensive interventions, Rwanda and a few
other developing countries were able to achieve
universal access to antiretroviral therapy, sharply
reducing transmission and mortality. However, in
many resource-limited settings, there is little avail-
ability of technical support to plan clinical and pre-
ventive interventions against NCD, let alone
operational research, supply chain management,
financing, and other key health sector activities.
Although UN delegates did ‘‘urge relevant interna-
tional organizations to continue to provide techni-
cal assistance and capacity-building to developing
countries, especially to the least developed coun-
tries, in the areas of non-communicable disease
prevention,’’ (Sect. 52) [1] there is currently no spe-
cific agency with a track record in low-income set-
tings that has the ability to render technical
assistance and support to countries for NCD-spe-
cific planning. Governments of poor countries are
likely to turn for advice either to their World
Health Organization (WHO) representatives or
to contract technical support organizations, inde-
pendent consultants suggested by development
partners.
Because of apparent differences in the epidemi-
ology and clinical course of NCD among the bot-
tom billion [2], it is not clear that there is
adequate experience in these quarters to guide the
strategic planning process. Recent discussions of
strategic planning in the NCD policy area have
emphasized the needs and considerations of mid-
dle-income countries. Even when the world’s poor-
est nations are considered, the implicit intervention
model is often based on experience in more affluent
settings. The Political Declaration of the High-
Level Meeting on NCD, for example, describes
the ‘‘common modifiable risk factors for non-com-
municable diseases’’ as unhealthy diet, tobacco use,physical inactivity, and the harmful use of alcohol––
at least 2 of which are rare in most settings of abso-
lute poverty (Sect. 35) [1].
Given the lack of available templates, high-bur-
den, low-income countries may find strategic plan-
ning for NCD interventions as mandated by the
General Assembly in September difficult. The
challenge will be complicated further by cracks in
the international framework for technical support.
Implementers and government administrators
want, on the one hand, to make the best use of
scarce resources to address an urgent problem
and, on the other, to preserve their strategic lati-
tude. They often do not have a good sense of what
assistance could be helpful to address their needs,
let alone which organizations may be able to pro-
vide it. Providers, for their part, often do not have
any systematic, timely sense of how much technical
assistance is needed, of what kind, and where. Do-
nors typically finance technical support reactively,
in response to observed problems well downstream.
In the best case, the objectives of all stakeholders
converge in a fruitful division of labor that assesses
the demand for technical expertise and directs it to
the areas of greatest need. In the worst case, how-
ever, inappropriate technical support can be a sig-
nificant and unnecessary waste of scarce human
and material resources. Supply-driven technical
support tends to divorce it from local needs, imped-
ing feedback from programs into norms and guide-
lines, hindering the development of local expertise
and capacity, and undermining replication of good
practices in the long term [3].
A broad consensus now exists that an unprece-
dented expansion of NCD-related interventions is
necessary, and furthermore, that it will be predi-
cated on stronger international cooperation ‘‘in
support of national, regional, and global plans for
the prevention and control of non-communicable
diseases, inter alia, through the exchange of best
practices in the areas of health promotion, legisla-
tion, regulation and health systems strengthening
‘‘(Sect. 45) [1].’’ To that end, this paper reviews
the structure and origins of currently available
mechanisms of technical support for health-sector
planning, placing them in the broader historical
context of the post–World War II international
development regime and the more recent move-
ment for aid effectiveness. It then proposes a mech-
anism for horizontal collaborations by low income-
countries in NCD strategic planning as a natural
and necessary evolution of development assistance
in health.
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Technical support and assistance typically refer to a
wide variety of inputs that span the short, medium,
and long terms, often relating to particular techni-
cal issues and systems. These inputs can range from
initiatives to train and build local capacity in a nar-
row range of skills (reading electrocardiograms) or
a broader one (laboratory microscopy), secondment
of staff to ministries to fulfill a particular function,
solving immediate supply-chain management
problems, and so on. Given the breadth of func-
tions represented by technical support, it is no sur-
prise that coordinating, implementing, and
evaluating it has proven a major challenge.
External technical support has been a key com-
ponent of international development efforts since
shortly after World War II. In his 1949 inaugural
address, US President Harry Truman launched a
campaign to make ‘‘the benefits of our scientific ad-
vances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped
areas.’’ With European overseas empires and trade
networks shattered by the war, many citizens of
newly decolonized nation–states were facing condi-
tions of great scarcity: ‘‘Their food is inadequate.
They are victims of disease. Their economic life
is primitive and stagnant.’’ Though Truman under-
scored limitations in ‘‘the material resources which
we can afford to use for the assistance of other peo-
ples,’’ he nonetheless urged American policy mak-
ers ‘‘to make available to peaceloving peoples the
benefits of our store of technical knowledge’’ while
pursuing international technical cooperation
‘‘through the United Nations and its specialized
agencies . . . for the achievement of peace, plenty,
and freedom’’ [4].
The presidential initiative that evolved over the
next decade into the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) was shaped explicitly by
the Cold War. Many new nations had embraced
a ‘‘false philosophy which purports to offer free-
dom, security, and greater opportunity to man-
kind’’ and others threatened to do so. Truman
saw the poverty of post-colonial successor states,
which made them more receptive to the Soviet Un-
ion, as ‘‘a handicap and a threat both to them and
to more prosperous areas’’ [4]. His agenda for ex-
panded technical assistance to poor countries was
thus in keeping with the other 3 points of the anti-
communist geostrategy outlined in his inaugural
address: support for the United Nations, expandedaid to Europe under the Marshall Plan, and ex-
panded military assistance to friendly regimes
worldwide [5,6].
The Point Four agenda of technical assistance
to what Truman called ‘‘underdeveloped areas’’ re-
flected––and exploited––the language of a new pro-
fessional class [7,8]. As the historian Amy Staples
notes, conferences at resort locations like Hot
Springs, Virginia, and Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, were framed initially within the Allied
war effort, but focused on ‘‘tasks to be handled by
experts rather than on traditional topics of diplo-
macy’’ [9]. The specialized UN agencies soon ex-
panded their official mandate along with that of
the parent organization, which by 1949 was adding
new members almost as fast as bankrupt European
empires could disgorge them. As at the US Social
Security Administration and Tennessee Valley
Authority during the 1930s, technical staff of the
WHO and Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) set themselves to rationalistic, long-term
development planning within a state model similar
to the one established by the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration’s New Deal [10]. After defining health as
a ‘‘state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity’’ and affirming the highest locally
attainable standard of health as a fundamental hu-
man right, the WHO 1946 constitution high-
lighted its mission to ‘‘(d) . . . furnish appropriate
technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary
aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments
. . . (f) establish and maintain such administrative
and technical services as may be required, including
epidemiological and statistical services . . . (j) pro-
mote co-operation among scientific and profes-
sional groups which contribute to the
advancement of health’’ (Cap. 2, Art. 1) [11].
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, success sto-
ries of ‘‘technology transfer’’ between the global
North and South inspired practitioners. Improve-
ment of modern technological capacity in poor
countries––not only physical artifacts but also new
organizational forms and ways of thinking––was
credited by the sociologist Govindan Parayil and
many subsequent observers for lasting social
changes and rapid economic development [12].
An example cited by many development specialists
is the so-called Green Revolution in agricultural
production which grew out of joint activity by gov-
ernments, private donor agencies such as the Ford
and Rockefeller Foundations, bilaterals such as
USAID, multilaterals such as the FAO, interna-
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Together, they created agricultural universities pat-
terned after the land-grant universities of the Uni-
ted States, an indigenous national agricultural
research system, a reorganized government farming
authority that undid colonial priorities and net-
works and facilitated the diffusion of new seeds
and expertise and a commitment to innovation by
rural food producers [8]. A decade later, farmers
were realizing 2- to 3-fold increases in yield com-
pared with yield from 1965 [14].
More often, however, international technical
support was blunted by Truman’s limits on ‘‘the
material resources which we can afford to use for
the assistance of other peoples.’’ Well over 80% of
American economic aid under Truman went to
Europe and the ‘‘rim countries’’ of the Soviet Union
[15]. When the Korean War broke out in 1952,
most US official development assistance (ODA)
was shifted to Southeast Asia. Only 21% remained
to divide between Africa, Latin America, and the
Middle East, and a substantial proportion of that
was in the form of loans subsidizing the exports
of American manufacturers and farmers [15]. To
the present day, the high-water mark of US
ODA is 1951, when it amounted to about 0.6%
of the gross domestic product (US$62 billion in
2008 dollars). A year later, when the Marshall Plan
expired, aid was 0.3% of the gross domestic product
and the ratio has continued to decline––by 2008, it
stood at about 0.2%. Worldwide, the ratio of ODA
to donor country national income has never ex-
ceeded the 1961 figure of 0.54%. After the Cold
War, it fell to 0.22%, and now it stands at about
0.31%, including large US transfers to Iraq and
Afghanistan [16,17].
Underfunding of the mandate for technical sup-
port disappointed its practitioners. In 1968, the
International Institute for Medical Electronics
and Biological Engineering was approached by an
unnamed country in North Africa (likely Algeria)
that was in the process of reorganizing its national
health system. A technical support team had been
dispatched by WHO, but it lacked experts on
instrumentation, automation, or information pro-
cessing. ‘‘The Minister of Health of that country
sends his representative to see us thinking that
we should be able to supply such expertise,’’ wrote
the institute’s director in frustration. ‘‘Our re-
sources do not permit it. They should’’ [18]. The
most dramatic international public health project
of the 1960s and 1970s, the global smallpox eradi-
cation campaign, is now thought to have succeededin part because it moved away from piecemeal tech-
nology transfer to national governments and se-
cured a major financial commitment from the
United States [19–21].
Inadequate resources for infrastructure develop-
ment called into question the plausibility of the
agenda outlined by Truman. ‘‘Farm machinery is
of little value without roads, skilled operators,
and available mechanics,’’ complained one observer
in 1969. ‘‘Without a coordinated movement toward
social reconstruction, there can be little hope that
technical aid can do any more than sink a splintered
20th century framework into the quagmire of an
old order that brims with tragic potentiality’’ [22].
This reflected a philosophical divergence, but it
also underscored a key weakness in the prevalent
model of technical support. The experts of donor
countries were often not well-equipped to share
and reproduce the ‘‘store of technical knowledge.’’
When the users of health intervention models
and other technologies failed to communicate di-
rectly with scientists and engineers who developed
them, new tools were imported without any ability
to put them into practice––or any sense of whether
they would in fact be useful [23]. The problem was
particularly acute in the poorest settings: ‘‘Two of
the essential elements are the utilization of local
knowledge, and the participation of the local peo-
ple in the whole process’’ [24].
By the late 1970s, with poor and affluent coun-
tries alike caught in a major global recession, there
was a widespread sense that the post-war develop-
ment regime had come to a dead end. ‘‘The most
basic needs of nearly one billion people remain un-
met,’’ a critic wrote, noting with many others that
although technological and resource capacity to ad-
dress these needs existed, a lack of political will was
hindering the response [25].
Poor countries increasingly sought to take mat-
ters into their own hands. The Buenos Aires Plan
of Action was written by 45 national ministers
and high-ranking development planners in 1978.
It advocated ‘‘South–South’’ or ‘‘horizontal’’ models
of technical cooperation as an evolutionary shift in
international relations. Horizontal technical sup-
port was seen as the core of a new international
economic order, ‘‘a vital force for initiating, design-
ing, and organizing’’ relations between developing
countries [26]. Analogous to the ‘‘positive devi-
ance’’ approach in community health, South–South
partnerships aim to capitalize on the similarities
between developing countries and to promote the
systematic analysis and implementation of success-
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39ful approaches [27]. As the Iron Curtain crumbled
and aid budgets plunged, formerly devoted advo-
cates of top-down development endorsed the new
spirit of horizontal technologization. Even W.W.
Rostow, a key early advocate of the vertical devel-
opment model, took note of the horizontal trend in
his preface to the third edition of The Stages of Eco-
nomic Growth: ‘‘Countries in the drive to techno-
logical maturity are closer to the early phases of
development and should be able to provide effec-
tive technical assistance’’ [28].
Like the Alma-Ata Declaration on primary
health care (also in 1978), action on the Buenos
Aires document was slow. Balance-of-payments
crises, debt defaults, high interest rates, and low
world prices for commodities absorbed the atten-
tion of governments in developing countries during
the 1980s and reduced their latitude for action.
Even Argentina did not establish its official techni-
cal support agency, the Fondo Argentino de Coop-
eracio´n Horizontal, until 1992 [29]. As of the mid-
1990s, the UN Development Program found that
developing countries tended to devalue horizontal
technical advice despite its far lower costs, and that
the UN system had failed to promote or fund it
adequately, due to ‘‘its underlying orientation and
pervasive institutional culture in favor of traditional
technical cooperation activities.’’ They recom-
mended that each country with the capacity to do
so follow the Argentinean model of a special unit
for horizontal technical support with administra-
tors competent to oversee the necessary contractual
relationships [30].A I D E F F E C T I V EN E S S AND T E CHN I C A L
SUP POR T I N G LOBA L HEA L TH 2 0 0 0 –
2 0 1 2
After aid flows rebounded from the end of the
Cold War, a notable investment was made in
development assistance for health by bilateral, mul-
tilateral, and private sector agencies [31–33]. From
US$5.6 billion in 1990, global development assis-
tance for health increased to more than US$21 bil-
lion in 2007 [34]. This increase was paralleled by
expansion in the number of global health organiza-
tions and initiatives [35].
To the frustration of many stakeholders, how-
ever, a significant amount of development assis-
tance for health never arrived in the recipient
countries. From the earliest days of the post-war
international aid regime, experts in developedcountries were the direct recipients of most grants
for the implementation of global health projects.
After excluding supranational organizations such
as global health partnerships and intergovernmen-
tal organizations, 82% of grants from the Gates
Foundation between 1998 and 2007 went to US-
based organizations, 13% to recipients in Europe
and other high-income countries, and only 5% to
recipients in low- and middle-income countries
[36,37].
Technical support continued to account for a
significant proportion of grants for development
activities in developing countries. In 2003, US$18
billion was allocated to technical aid––more than
one-quarter of all contributions [38]. Critics ar-
gued that although many external consultants and
contract technical support organizations lacked
expertise on matters of contextual importance and
failed to deliver adequate return on investment,
they were nonetheless prioritized over national
researchers and implementers. External consultants
were less likely to feel responsible to ensure
improvements in capacity; indeed they had perverse
incentives to maintain their usefulness and rele-
vance at a given project location. Meanwhile, they
were impeding government personnel and other
national staff from developing their own skills in
the assumption that external experts would always
be available, while duplicating activities by the
establishment of parallel institutions [39,40].
At high-level global forums on aid effectiveness
in Paris (2005) and Accra, Ghana (2008), partici-
pants focused considerable attention on the need
to strengthen, rather than undermining, countries’
own institutions and systems for technical support,
and their local expertise. Echoing 30 years of advo-
cacy on behalf of South–South cooperation, the
Accra Agenda reimagined the project of develop-
ment as a horizontal partnership rather than a ver-
tical transfer, with an emphasis on building
technical skills. Poor countries were urged to ‘‘sys-
tematically identify areas where there is a need to
strengthen the capacity to perform and deliver ser-
vices at all levels––national, sub-national, sectoral,
and thematic,’’ and to design their own strategies
for addressing these deficits. Capacity development
was to be demand-driven rather than supply-driven
and was to support country ownership. To that
end, donors and recipients would jointly select
and manage technical cooperation and promote lo-
cal and regional experts as consultants [41].
The experience of the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) pro-
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have shaped technical support in the health sector.
Established as a financing instrument, with a man-
date only to provide funding, the initial vision was
for GFATM financing to flow seamlessly into
existing national programs, with a host of partners
(both domestic and external, whether multilateral,
governmental or from civil society, and the private
sector) contributing any technical support needed
to make the programs function effectively [3].
According to a 2005 external review [42], this
approach suffered from––and revealed––several
problems in the international architecture of tech-
nical support.
Inadequate capacity among providers. In many
cases, the partners that were supposed to be provid-
ing the accompanying technical support were not
ready to scale-up their activities. There was no
international agreement on who should do what
and where, nor were there any mechanisms in place
at the global level to ensure coordination among
providers. At the country-level, there were typically
several structures that could play this role. In gen-
eral, however, they were not adequately involved in
the process of identifying technical support needs
and matching these with providers due to confu-
sion over roles and mandates, capacity deficits,
and a lack of willingness on the part of some pro-
viders of technical support to engage in collabora-
tive endeavors (a tendency that was perhaps
exacerbated by the competitive market approach
fostered by the Global Fund).
Inadequate coordination between providers and
funders. Initially, the link between Global Fund
financing and technical support providers was not
smooth. In the first several rounds of Global Fund
financing, there was a lack of clarity about whether
Global Fund resources could be used to finance
technical support, meaning that few countries in-
cluded discrete budget requests for it. Although
this was subsequently clarified, budget requests
for technical support continued to be minimal.
Even when dedicated financing was received, the
market-based approach of enabling countries to
shop around and buy-in technical support did not
immediately work as well as hoped. This seemed
to be at least in part because the fundamentals nec-
essary to make the market function had not been
established. In particular, stakeholders at country-
level were often poorly acquainted with organiza-
tions able to provide technical support (and their
strengths and weaknesses). Further, a country-dri-
ven approach often did not adequately fund globalpublic goods [43,44]. Global or cross-country
activities––such as normative work or the sharing
of lessons learned––were typically not reflected in
the planning process of individual countries.
To address problems with the financing of tech-
nical support, several other organizations, including
the German Agency for International Cooperation
(GIZ) and the World Bank, directly financed the
provision of technical support related to Global
Fund grants. Despite this, some providers of tech-
nical support––particularly WHO and the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) and to a lesser extent bilateral organi-
zations––argued that the advent of the Global Fund
created an ‘‘unfunded mandate’’ that obligated
them to provide additional assistance without ade-
quate additional resources [3].
Inadequate funding for needs assessment. There
was initially no systematic way to identify which
countries required technical support in the event
that the countries themselves did not detect prob-
lems and to ensure that technical support was being
provided to address them. In the early days of the
Global Fund, as in the NCD area today, this man-
ifested primarily around the provision of support
for the preparation of proposals. The problem
was largely resolved through a combination of ini-
tiatives by countries themselves (the potential avail-
ability of resources making them more willing to
seek outside assistance) and of analyses by the Glo-
bal Fund, WHO, and UNAIDS enabling technical
support to be targeted to the countries that were
having difficulty preparing high-quality proposals.
However, identification of problems in the
course of implementation went less smoothly, and
the results were seen as countries started to reach
the first major evaluation point (Phase 2). A num-
ber of countries experienced difficulties severe en-
ough to jeopardize additional financing in the
Global Fund’s performance-based funding system,
requiring the formation of an ‘‘Ad Hoc Working
Group on Technical Support’’ [45]. In 2005, the
World Bank was forced to provide an emergency
International Development Association credit for
technical and implementation support to permit
the use of a Global Fund grant for HIV/AIDS.
In another instance, the UK Department for Inter-
national Development was compelled to second its
own staff members to the Global Fund to monitor
Global Fund-supported projects [46].
Following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness (March 2005), UNAIDS convened an ex-
pert panel to help improve management and
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41implementation of HIV-related country programs.
It discovered surprisingly few thorough evaluations
of the technical support needed to meet targets such
as the Millennium Development Goals and the ‘‘3
by 5’’ Initiative for scale-up of antiretroviral treat-
ment. Monitoring and evaluation were often ‘‘add-
ons appended to plans by specialists,’’ rather than
being an integral part of the broader planning pro-
cess [47]. Countries such as Rwanda echoed this cri-
tique, pleading with donors and their technical
advisors for a single set of training, evaluation, and
reporting frameworks, whose proliferation was
causing miscommunication and wasted resources.
In retrospect, the social structure of interna-
tional development projects would seem to have
been undermining their effectiveness. Instead of
leveraging local knowledge and capacity for tech-
nological change, donors were once again suc-
cumbing to the overreliance on consultants from
high-income countries that had haunted the inter-
national aid regime since the 1950s.
Late in 2005, UNAIDS began to experiment
with ‘‘technical support facilities’’ (TSF), small
management teams hosted by existing regional
institutions. Covering some 80 countries in East-
ern, West-Central, and Southern Africa; Southeast
Asia; and South Asia–Oceania, the TSF arranged
training and support for over 2000 national and re-
gional consultants and country partners between
2005 and 2011. With the aid of this new mecha-
nism, US$1.7 billion in Global Fund grants were
disbursed and 59 countries were helped to develop
national strategic or operational plans. Of 125
technical support assignments, 85% were under-
taken by consultants from the same country or re-
gion, helping to develop local capacity and
reducing costs [48].
The TSF are a novel manifestation of the
broader trend toward endogenous or ‘‘triangular’’
technological change. Brazil’s successful maternal
milk bank program for combating infant mortality
has been adapted by several Latin American coun-
tries [49]. In 2009, Ecuador and Bolivia collabo-
rated on a dengue fever surveillance project that
focused on epidemiologic surveillance, outbreak
control, and community participation [50]. Be-
tween 2008 and 2011, Mexico provided technical
assistance and consulting services to facilitate the
implementation of the National Care Model for
Children’s Mental Health in Costa Rica [49].
The Argentine Republic collaborated on a project
on capacity development for the provision of health
services provided to the Labor and Public OfficeMinistry of Niger between 2007 and 2009 [50].
Cuba’s specialized vaccine producers (Finlay and
Heber Biotec) partnered with the Egyptian na-
tional vaccine production facility to improve capac-
ity in the field of selected vaccine manufactures
[51]. There has also been knowledge-sharing be-
tween Brazil and Ghana, as well as other African
countries, on ‘‘conditional cash transfer’’ programs
and other similar initiatives [52]. The government
of India is now partnering with the African Union
member states to develop a Pan African e-network
for medical services and human resources [53]. Not
least, ministries of health in the Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago have begun a joint collaboration on the
surveillance of NCD within their territories
through the development of a Caribbean Regional
NCD Surveillance System [50].
These government activities are increasingly
complemented by health policy institutes in low-
and middle-income countries. Many such think
tanks were initially established with state funding
but now contribute independently to health policy
agenda setting, implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation. A recent article by Bennett et al. [54] of-
fers 6 detailed case studies of health policy think
tanks in Bangladesh, Ghana, India, South Africa,
Uganda, and Vietnam––ranging from nongovern-
mental organizations, to university institutes, to
government-owned entities––finding them quite
effective as drivers of policy development through
advice to decision makers and policy-relevant re-
search. The INSouth website [55], meanwhile, has
catalogued over 80 independent or quasi-govern-
mental think tanks in developing countries, along
with 118 intergovernmental agencies dedicated to
technical collaboration on urgent policy questions.A NEW MODE L FOR HOR I ZONTA L
T E CHN I CA L SUP POR T ?
By examining the modern history of technical
assistance, we are able to see the project of develop-
ment along a very different trajectory, and even to
alter the strategies that we pursue. The 3 years
since the Accra conference have seen a marked
intensification in what is termed South–South
cooperation, reflected among other places in the
General Assembly’s Political Declaration on
NCD itself (Sect. 48) [1]. Recent research demon-
strates that developing countries have been active
in such exchanges throughout the last century
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problematizations of development. In 1960, when
the Cold War hot spots of Eastern Europe and
Central and Southeast Asia still accounted for
79% of US ODA, Rostow used public health as
an example of the homeostasis that enforced his
invariant 5-part sequential model of economic
and social change. It is, he argued, ‘‘virtually impos-
sible for responsible leaders to reject measures . . .
that will lengthen life but put pressure on the food
supply.’’ Moreover, he warned, ‘‘Societies that deny
themselves modernization also leave themselves
open to intrusion, and soon or late they may be dri-
ven to accept the world of modern technology’’
[28].
From Rostow’s time to our own, however, the
urgent question has not been whether governments
and other stakeholders should embrace modern
technological organization, but according to what
specific model and under whose auspices. Narra-
tives in which modern, developed nations of the
global North were able to ‘‘close the book on infec-
tious disease’’ (in contrast to infection-plagued re-
gions of the global South) became routine by the
1960s, reaching their height in the widely cited ab-
stract models of Egyptian demographer Abdel Ra-
him Omran. Like Rostow, Omran [57] argued that
all societies in the modern world go through three
consistent stages of development: an ‘‘Age of Pesti-
lence and Famine’’ with average life expectancy at
birth under 40 years; an ‘‘Age of Receding Pan-
demics’’ in which life expectancy increases to about
50 years; and finally, an ‘‘Age of Degenerative Dis-
eases’’ as biomedicine and improved living stan-
dards outrun microbial pathogens and lifespans
have increased so much that people are more likely
to die from chronic diseases and NCD than infec-
tious ones.
Omran’s theory of an epidemiologic transition
was proposed in 1971, when many felt that pro-
gress against smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis
through mass vaccination and pharmacotherapy
made it possible to shift funding either toward
treating cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and other
NCD (in wealthy countries) or toward population
control programs (in poor ones) [58,59]. Yet, over
the last 3 decades, it has become clear that the
advocates of development and modernization over-
stated the inevitability and impact of these pro-
cesses. There is no ‘‘post-infectious world,’’ and
all societies are not progressing along a single epi-
demiological path. From the vantage of Mexico 2
decades ago, Frenk and colleagues [60,61] recog-nized that for middle-income countries with both
communicable and noncommunicable disease bur-
dens, this narrative simply did not hold.
Frenk’s critique of the idealized epidemiological
transition in favor of a complex process of health
transitions would become all the more significant
by the early 21st century, when the double burden
of infectious diseases and NCD became evident even
among the poorest nations. As the first comprehen-
sive NCD interventions are undertaken in countries
such as Haiti and Rwanda, this picture has become
still more complex; major chronic diseases that char-
acterize high-income settings, such as cardiovascular
diseases, diabetes, cancer, respiratory illnesses, and
mental illness, are to be found both in middle-in-
come settings and low-income countries––but their
etiology is often quite discrepant.
Rwanda offers an excellent illustration of how
the Non-Aligned Movement’s conceptual frame-
work of South–South technical cooperation breaks
down in the context of actual health interventions.
Despite strong economic growth over the past dec-
ade, more than 50% of the country lives on less
than a dollar a day [62]. In findings summarized
by the Rwanda 2007–2008 interim Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) more than 80% of the
Rwandese population lives in rural areas, and the
2002 census showed that roughly 80% of the pop-
ulation worked in the agricultural sector [63]. The
2005 DHS documented a relatively low prevalence
and intensity of tobacco use (4.6% in women aged
15–49 years and 21% in men aged 15–59 years)
[64,65]. A population-based cancer registry from
the Butare prefecture between 1991 and 1994
found that only 5% of identified malignancies could
possibly be attributed to tobacco use [66]. The
2005 DHS found that whereas only 10% of women
aged 15–49 years in rural areas had a body mass in-
dex consistent with overweight (P25 kg/m2), 20%
of this population had a body mass index consistent
with malnutrition (618.5 kg/m2).
Given the currently low level of tobacco use in
Rwanda, the high proportion of labor-intensive
subsistence farming, and the high rate of malnutri-
tion, the country’s endemic burden of NCD almost
certainly reflects the impact of infection, cooking-
related pollution, and gaps in some health services,
rather than those risk factors normally associated
with lifestyle-related diseases.
Like many other low-income countries, the
challenge confronted by Rwanda in intervening
against epidemic and endemic NCD is magnified
by not only poverty and its recent history of state
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43violence and social upheaval, but also by resource
deprivation in all aspects of the health sector.
Yet, over the past 5 years, Rwanda has cut infant
mortality in half by preventing and treating the
top infectious killers––malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/
AIDS, respiratory infections, and diarrheal dis-
eases. Now it is rolling out the first national strate-
gic action plan for NCD in a low-income country,
decentralizing to the district and health-center lev-
els an innovative service integration model that
trains or augments existing healthcare resources
(e.g., HIV/AIDS accompagnateurs) to deliver
NCD interventions [67].
To Rwanda’s public health experts, the experi-
ence with HIV made clear that approaches to pre-
vention, care, and treatment must be integrated
with each other and with comprehensive primary
care from the start. Integration, they found, is
the key to sustainability and program flexibility in
the face of complex dynamics in global health
funding and policy. Thus, their approach to
NCD control built on and was integrated with
communicable disease management programs.
Over the last 12 months, aid from the Rockefel-
ler Foundation has allowed Rwanda to offer bilat-
eral technical support on health financing and child
and maternal health to Congo, Tanzania, Swazi-
land, Bangladesh, Togo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria,
Benin, the Comoros, and Chad. Like other gov-
ernment departments, the Health Ministry recently
established a ‘‘Single Project Implementation Unit’’
to oversee execution, monitoring, and reporting of
externally financed projects in keeping with the
Paris Declaration and the Kigali Statement of Ac-
tion adopted at the 9th Government of Rwanda
and Development Partners Meeting in 2010. The
Single Project Implementation Unit currently
manages more than $500 million in grants from
Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, UK
Department for International Development, and
German Agency for International Cooperation,
among other donors. The Global Fund’s March
2011 audit of its funding to Rwanda found tight
control over the quality of grant progress reports,
strong government commitment, involvement and
leadership in planning, implementing and provid-
ing oversight of the programs, and impressive pro-
gram achievements. Rwanda was rated in 2011 as
the least corrupt country in East Africa in Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Index; 1 of only
3 African countries to make the top 50.
Countries classified as low-income have been
recent recipients of so-called South–South techni-cal support, but rarely if ever initiators. The mate-
rial bar to such collaboration has been too high.
The standard model of horizontal cooperation re-
quires a significant opportunity cost to participat-
ing government agencies as well as an up-front
material outlay. Yet, given adequate external fund-
ing, Rwanda’s government personnel can serve as
the catalyst of truly collaborative and durable tech-
nical alliances.CONC LU S I ON S
Increasing burden and awareness of NCD in the
developing world present the international system
with a challenge no less important than the one it
faced a decade ago with HIV/AIDS. Untreated
heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and other NCD
can shorten the average life expectancy by much as
20 years in many settings, but equipping health sys-
tems with the means to prevent, treat, and monitor
them is a daunting task. Nonetheless, the technolo-
gies to do so exist. The question is whether they will
be adapted and shared. That would require an evo-
lutionary step in the international aid regime.
Rwanda’s leadership has emphasized to devel-
opment partners the importance of ‘‘sustainable
and dignified’’ aid that avoids dependent relation-
ships, facilitating popular participation and private
sector involvement [68]. In keeping with these pri-
orities, a Rwanda-based initiative for horizontal
technical support in the NCD sector might supply,
for example, a temporary funding stream allowing
work with other low-income countries to produce
multisectoral NCD strategic plans adapted for cir-
cumstances on the ground. Simultaneously, it
would train Rwandan personnel in norms and pro-
cedures of international consulting, allowing them
to participate fully in the regional consulting mar-
ket––at which point, the horizontal cooperation
unit would be self-sustaining.
Such a project would widen the market for tech-
nical support and provide a novel public–private
model in the health sector; nor need low-income
countries be the only beneficiaries. Many wealthy
nations now look to Bangladesh, India, and Rwan-
da for lessons on high-value delivery of care for
infectious disease. A Rwanda-based horizontal
cooperation unit focused on strategic planning for
NCD could offer a viable mechanism for reverse
innovation from poor countries to more affluent
ones, bringing the 60-year project of development
full-circle.
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